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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDITY OF MARKETING PROGRAM ESTABLISHED UNDER THE CALIFORNIA AGRICULTURAL PRORATE AcT-Appellee,
a producer and packer of raisins in California, alleging that enforcement of
the proration marketing agreement established under the California Agricultural
Prorate Act 1 would prevent him from fulfilling sales contracts and from purchasing for sale and selling raisins in interstate commerce, brought suit in the
district court to enjoin enforcement of the program for marketing the 1940
raisin crop. The n;iarketing program was challenged as in violation of the
Sherman Antitrust Act 2 and the commerce clause of the United States Con-

1 Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, Supp. 1941), Act 143a (Stat. 1933, p. 1969, as
amended by Stat. 1935, pp. 1526, 2087; Stat. Ex. Sess. 1938, p. 39; Stat. 1939, pp.
1702, 1947, 2485; Stat. 1941-, pp. 2050, 2858, 2943). The act provides that upon
petition of ten producers for the establishment of a marketing plan for any commodity
within a defined production zone [§ 8] and after public hearing [§ 9] and prescribed
findings tliat such. a program will prevent economic vtaste and conserve the agricultural wealth of the state without permitting unreasonable profits to producers [§ IO],
the Director of Agriculture shall select_ a program committee from nominees chosen
by producers to which he may add not more than two handlers or packers [§§ l I, 14,
1 5]. The proration marketing program is formulated by the program committee
[§ 15] and must be approved by 65% in number of producers within the zone
owning 5 l % of acreage devoted to production of the commodity [ § I 6]. The proration program for raisins involved in the principal case provided that 70% of the
producer's raisins should be placed in "pools" to be disposed of by the program committee; the remaining 3oo/o-"free tonnage"-could be marketed by the producer
through ordinary trade channels providing he obtained a certificate and paid a fee
for each ton covered by the certificate. The California Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the act in Agricultural Prorate Commission v. Superior Court, 5
Cal. (2d) 550, 55 P. (2d) 495 (1936).
2 26 Stat. L. 209 (1890), as amended by 50 Stat. L. 693 (1937), 15 U. S. C.
(1940), § I.
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stitution and as in conflict with and superseded by the Federal Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of r937. 8 The district court granted the injunction, 4 holding that the effect of the marketing program was to place a controlled
embargo on California raisin production and on the supply of raisins in interstate trade channels,11 thus constituting a direct and illegal interference with
interstate commerce. Held, on appeal, the California prorate program for the
I 940 raisin crop is not rendered invalid by the Sherman Act, 8 the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, or the commerce clause of the federal
Constitution. Parker"· Brown, (U. S. r943) 63 S. Ct. 307.
The Court found that the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937
does not represent such an occupation of the legislative field by the federal government as to preclude operation of the state act. If Congress acts in the
exercise of its commerce power, making clear its intent to occupy the field
exclusively, state action conflicting with federal legislation is invalid; but if the
prohibition of state action is not express but must be inferred from the scope and
objective of federal legislation, state acts are not to be invalidated unless there
is a clear case of conflict.7 To determine whether or not such conflict exists
8 50 Stat. L. 246 (1937), 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 601 et seq. After oral argument
on appeal, the Supreme Court restored the cause to the docket for reargument, requesting counsel to discuss whether the state statute was rendered invalid by the action
of Congress in passing the Sherman Act, the Agricultural Adjustment Act, or any
other act of Congress. Parker v. Brown, (U. S. 1942) 62 S. Ct. 1266.
4 Brown v. Parker, (D. C. Cal. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 895. The opinion of the district court was confined to the interstate commerce question. See note 3, supra.
5 The district court found that almost all the raisins consumed in the United
States are produced in the proration zone involved in the principal case and that
between 90 and 95 % of the raisins grown in California are shipped in interstate or
foreign commerce. Principal case, 63 S. Ct. 307 at 310 (1943).
8 The Court found that the purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act, as indicated
by its legislative history and by its language, was not to restrain state action, but to suppress combinations to restrain competition by individuals and corporations. Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U. S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940); Standard Oil Co. of
New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502 (1911); United States v.
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., (C. C. A. 6th, 1898) 85 F. 271, a.ffd. 175 U. S. 2n,
20 S. Ct. 96 (1899). The prorate program does not operate by force of agreement
or combination by individuals or corporations; but rather the state, operating through
the Prorate Advisory Commission, adopts and enforces the program in the execution
of a state governmental policy. The state makes no contract and enters into no combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade against which the Sherman Act was directed.
This aspect of the case will not be discussed further.
7 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148, 62 S. Ct. 491 (1942);
Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U. S. 598, 60 S. Ct. 726 (1940); Welch Co. v. New
Hampshire, 306 U.S. 79, S9 S. Ct. 438 (1939); Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss,
302 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 87 (1937); Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U. S. 44r, 57 S. Ct.
842 (1937); Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Illinois e~ rel. McLaughlin,
298 U.S. 155, 56 S. Ct. 685 (1936); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U. S. 346, 53 S. Ct.
61 I (1933); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. R. v. Railroad Commission of California, 283
U. S. 381, 51 S. Ct. 553 (1930); Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Public Utility Commissioners, 278 U. S. 24, 49 S. Ct. 69 (1928); Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v.
Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 46 S. Ct. 279 (1926); Carey v. South Dakota, 250 U.S.
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"the Court must take affirmative congressional legislation by the four corners,
study it, and decide whether it forecloses all state action." 8 Examination of the
whole structure of the federal act indicated to the Court that Congress contemplated that its purposes might be achieved by a state program either with or
without issuance of a federal program by the Secretary of Agriculture. 9 The
federal act is effective only if the Secretary of Agriculture orders a program,1°
and since the secretary had taken none of the statutoi.y steps with respect to
issuance of an orde_r regulating the marketing of raisins, the Court argued that
the secretary did not believe such an order would tend to effectuate the policy
of the act. Moreover, the federal act authorizes .the secretary to confer and
co-operate with state authorities to effectuate the policy of the act; 11 and the
absence of conflict between the two statutes is further indicated by the facts that
officials of the Department of Agriculture co-operated with state officials in
drafting the I 940 state raisin marketing program and that the Department of
Agriculture gave approval to the state program by a loan agreement between
the state and the Commodity Credit Corporation, the_ loans being conditional
upon adoption of the marketing program at issue. There would thus appear
to be no clear case of conflict between the two acts and no such occupation of
the field by the federal government, through the mere adoption of the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act without any issuance of an order by the secretary, as to preclude the state from acting.12 Since approximately ninety-five per
cent of the California raisin crop is marketed in interstate commerce,18 the
marketing program, involving .restraints on sale and marketing of raisins to
u8, 39 S. Ct.
U. S. 493, 38
34 S. Ct. 829
8 Braden,
(1942).

403 (1919); Illinois Central R. R. v. Public Utility Commission, 245
S. Ct. 170 (1918); Atlantic Coast R. R. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280,
(1914); Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501,, 32 S. Ct. 715 (1912).
"Umpire to the Federal System," 10 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 27 at 30
.

9 " ••• The only suggested possibility of conflict is between the declared purpose
of the two acts. The object of the federal statute is stated to be the establishment •••
of 'orderly marketing conditions for agricultural commodities in interstate commerce'
such as will tend to establish 'parity prices'' for farm products. • •• The declared objective of the California Act is to prevent excessive supplies of agricultural commodities from 'adversely affecting the market' •••• the evident purpose and effect of the
regulation is to 'conserve the agricultural wealth of tlie State' by raising and maintaining prices, but 'without permitting unreasonable profits to the producers.' The only
possibility of conflict would seem to be, if a State program were to raise prices beyond
the parity price prescribed by the Federal Act, a condition which has not occurred."
Principal case, 63 S. Ct. 307 at 315-316.
10 The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act provides that when the Secretary
of Agriculture has reason to believe that the policy of the act will be effectuated by
the issuance of an order, after notice and hearing he shall issue the order. 7 U. S. C.

(1940), § 608.
.
11 7 U.S. C. (1940), § 610 (i).
12 ''We have no occasion to decide whether the same conclusion would follow if
the state program had not been adopted with the collaboration of officials of the Department of Agriculture and aided by loans from the Commodity Credit Corporation
recommended by the Secretary of Agriculture." Principal case, 6 3 S. Ct. 307 at 3 I 7.
18 Principal case, 63 S. Ct. 307 at 3 IO.
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buyers who ship out of the state, has a substantial e:ffect on interstate commerce.
The principal case presented the question whether, in the absence of congressional legislation in conflict with the state program, these restrictions, imposed upon sales of raisins within the state by producers to packers who process
the product before packing and shipping it in interstate commerce, are in contravention of the commerce clause of the federal Constitution. The Court
found the marketing regulation a valid exercise of state power not in contravention of the commerce clause on two grounds: (I) the transactions to which
the regulation applies are wholly intrastate before the product is ready for shipment interstate, and ( 2) the program is a regulation of a matter of local concern which does not impair national control over interstate commerce "in a
manner or to a degree forbidden by the Constitution."
In determining the validity of state tax and regulatory measures, the Court
has often resorted to a mechanical test to decide when interstate commerce begins and ends, holding that manufacture is not interstate commerce so as to be
immune from taxation or regulation.14 Recent cases involving federal legislation 15 have rejected the concept of the separability of production or manufacture and the commerce in which it results, but apparently the concept still has
some vitality in determining the validity of state legislation. On the basis of
this distinction, state regulation of manufacture has been upheld where, directed
at a matter of local concern, it has resulted in material reduction or even complete prevention of commerce in the regulated product; 16 likewise state licens14 " ••• manufacture is not commerce. • • • And the fact, of itself, that an article
when in the process of manufacture is intended for export to another state does not
render it an article of interstate commerce." Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi,
257 U. S. 129 at 136, 42 S. Ct. 42 (192,1). To the same effect, Bayside Fish Flour
Co. v. Gentry, 297 U. S. 422, 56 S. Ct. 513 (1936); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17, 54 S. Ct. 267 (1934); Minnesota v. Blasius,
290 U. S. 1, 54 S. Ct. 34 (1933); Champlin Refining Co. v. Commission, 286 U. S.
210, 52 S. Ct. 559 (1932); Utah Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U. S. 165, 52
S. Ct. 548 (1932); Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U. S. 284, 47 S. Ct. 638
(1927); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U. S. 172, 43 S. Ct. 526 (1923);
Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 S. Ct. 83 (1922); Susquehanna
Coal Co. v. South Amboy, 228 U. S. 665, 33 S. Ct. 712 (1913); General Oil Co.
v. Crain, 209 U.S. 2II, 28 S. Ct. 475 (1908); Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6 S.
Ct. 475 (1886).
15 In Wickard v. Filburn, (U. S. 1942) 63 S. Ct. 82 at 89, involving the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Court said, ''Whether the subject of the regulation in
question was 'production,' 'consumption' or 'marketing' is, therefore, not material for
purposes of deciding the question of federal power before us. That an activity is of
local character may help in a doubtful case to determine whether Congress intended to
reach it. The same consideration might help in determining whether in the absence
of Congressional action it would be permissible for the state to exert its power on the
subject matter, even though in so doing it to some degree affected interstate commerce." See also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 61 S. Ct. 451 (1941).
16 Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Co., 300 U. S. 55, 57 S. Ct. 364 (1937);
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U. S. 210~ 52 S. Ct. 599
(1932); Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 35 S. Ct. 501 (1915); Capital City Dairy
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ing and taxing statutes have been upheld when applied to intrastate buyers where,
in the usual course of business, the article bought will be resold in interstate
commerce.17 The basis of these decisions is that state taxation or regulation is
not prohibited by the commerce clause, notwithstanding its effect on interstate
·commerce, if imposed prior to any operation in interstate commerce. Following
this line of argument, the Court concluded in the principal,case that the state
marketing program, which controls disposition by the producer of his raisins
prior to the operation of processing and packing for interstate sale and shipment,
applies to transactions wholly intrastate and therefore subject to state regulation. 18 «This distinction between local regulation of those who are not engaged
in commerce, although the commodity which they produce and sell to local
buyers is ultimately destined for interstate commerce, and the regulation of
those who engage in the commerce by selling the product interstate, has in
general served, and serves here, as a ready means of distinguishing those local
activities which, under the Commerce Clause, are the appropriate subject of
state regulation despite their effect on interstate commerce.m9
But the Court did not rest its decision solely upon the mechanical distinction
between interstate and intrastate transactions. It invoked the doctrine of Cooley
v. Board of Port Wardens 20 that federal power, though unexercised, is exclusive only with respect to matters of national concern requiring uniformity of
regulation by a single authority; while in matters of local concern, admitting
of diversity of treatment in terms of particular local conditions, the states may
act, in the absence of congressional action, even though state regulation may
affect interstate commerce.21 This doctrine involves reconciliation of power
Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238, 22 S. Ct. 120 (1902); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 9
Ct. 6 (1888).
17 Chassaniol v. Greenwood, 291 U.S. 584, 54 S. Ct. 541 (1934).
18 The Court distinguishes the principal case from Shafer v. Farmers' Grain Co.,
268 U. S. 189, 45 S. Ct. 481 (1925) and Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U. S. ·
50, 42 S. Ct. 244 (1922), relied on by appellee, on the ground that in the latter
cases, involving purchase of grain within the state for immediate shipment to out of
state points without resale or processing, the purchase was a part of interstate commerce. See also Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 42 S. Ct.
106 (1921).
19 Principal case, 63 S. Ct. 307 at 319.
20 12 How. (53 U.S.) 299 (1851).
21 Illinois Natural Gas Co. v. Public Service Commission, 314 U.S. 498, 62 S.
Ct. 384 (1942); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S. 390, 62 S. Ct. 311 (1941);
California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930 (1941); Milk Control Board
v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346, 59 S. Ct. 528 (1939); South Carolina
State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510 (1938); Kelly
v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 87 (1937); Townsend v.
Yeomans, 301 U. S. 441, 57 S. Ct. 842 (1937); Bradley v. Public Utilities Commission, 289 U. S. 92, 53 S. Ct. 577 (1933); Continental Baking Co. v. Woodring,
286 U.S. 352, 52 S. Ct. 595 (1932), Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S. Ct. 581
(1931); Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135, 47 S. Ct. 548 (1927); Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 35 S. Ct. 140 (1915); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352,
33 S. Ct. 729 (1913); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. v. Hefly, 158 U.S. 98, 15 S. Ct. 802
(1895); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, IO S. Ct. 862 (1890); Bowman v.

s.
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granted to Congress with that· reserved to the states in terms of the competing
de_mands of state and national interests. 22 In determining the validity of state
regulation, the Court has often inquired whether the burden on interstate commerce was "direct"28 or merely incidental and remote 24 or whether the regulation discriminated against interstate commerce. 25 In a dissent in the Di
Santo 26 case, Chief Justice ( then Justice) Stone pointed out the limitations of
the "direct" burden test and suggested that "those interferences not deemed
forbidden are to be sustained, not because the effect on commerce is nominally
indirect, but because a consideration of all the facts and circumstances, such as
the nature of the regulation, its function, the character of the business involved
and the actual effect of the :flow of commerce, lead to the conclusion that the
regulation concerns interests peculiarly local and does not infringe the national
Chicago & N. W. Ry., 125 U. S. 465, 8 S. Ct. 689, 1062 (1888); Wabash, St. L.
& P. Ry. v. Illinois, I 18 U. S. 557, 7 S. Ct. 4 (1886); Gloucester Ferry Co. v,
Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 S. Ct. 826 (1885); County of Mobile v. Kimball,
102 U. S. 691 (1880); Welton v. Missouri, 91 U. S. 275 (1875); Willson v.
Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 245 (1829). See also Barnett, "The
Supreme Court, The Commerce Clause and State Legislation," 40 MrcH. L. REv. 49
(1941); Dowling, "Interstate Commerce and State Power," 27 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940).
22 Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Farm Products, 306 U. S. 346, 59 S. Ct.
528 (1939); South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177,
58 S. Ct. 510 (1938).
28 The Court has not defined the term "direct" burden nor has it attempted to
indicate in particular cases the precise effects of state regulation which constitute a
"direct'' burden. In view of the purpose of the commerce clause, it seems reasonable
to assume that the Court had in mind restrictions which cut down the volume of
interstate commerce or caused such commerce to be diverted into artificial channels.
In any event, the problem is essentially one of degree, since few, if any, of the state
statutes held valid by the Court have had no effect on interstate commerce.
24 Townsend v. Yeomans, 301 U.S. 441, 57 S. Ct. 842 (1937); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 49 S. Ct. I (1928); Shafer v. Farmers' Grain
Co., 268 U. S. 189, 45 S. Ct. 481 (1925); Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v.
Day, 266 U. S.71, 45 S. Ct. 12 (1924); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S.
172, 43 S. Ct. 526 (1923); Pennsylvania v, West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553, 43 S.
Ct. 658 (1923); Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50, 42 S. Ct. 244 (1922);
Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282, 42 S. Ct. 106 (1921);
International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U. S. 135, 38 S. Ct. 292 (1918);
Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Foster, 247 U. S. 105, 38 S. Ct. 438 (1918);
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 352, 33 S. Ct. 729 (1913); Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, II S. Ct. 851 (1890); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. II3 (1876).
25 Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313, IO S. Ct. 862 (1890).
26 Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U. S. 34 at 44, 47 S. Ct. 267 (1927). " •.• the
traditional test of the limit of state action by inquiring whether the interference with
compierce is direct or indirect seems to me too mechanical, too uncertain in its application, and too remote from actualities, to be of value. In thus making use of the
expressions, 'direct' and 'indirect interference' w'ith commerce, we are doing little
more than using labels to describe a result rather than any trustworthy formula by
which it is reached." Query: does not this criticism apply also to the mechanical test
for determining when interstate commerce begins and ends?

974

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

interest in maintaining the freedom of commerce across state lines." 27 While
language reminiscent of the "direct" burden approach has appeared in cases
decided after the Di Santo dissent was written, 28 the Court in a number of
cases has approached the question of state regulation in terms of an analysis more
nearly akin to that suggested in the Di Santo dissent. 29 It should be recognized,
however, that this approach involves weighing the practical effects of state
legislation, a task which may not prove inviting to those members of the Court
who would prefer to leave such matters to legislative decision. 80 In the principal case, the Court rejected the "direct" burden test, 81 upholding the marketing program because upon analysis of all relevant facts and circumstances it
believed that the matter was most appropriately regulated by the state and,
because of the local character, could never be adequatefy regulated by Congress.
The state, with knowledge of local conditions, was attempting to prevent serious
273 U. S. 34 at 44, 47 S. Ct. 267 (1927).
Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U. S. 511, 55 S. Ct. 497 (1935); Continental Baking
Co. v. Woodring, 286 U.S. 352, 52 S. Ct. 595 (1932).
.
29 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390, 62 S. Ct. 311 (1941); Calif<:>rnia v.
Thompson, 313 U.S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930 (1941); Milk Control Board v~ Eisenberg
Farm Products, 306 U.S. 346, 59 S. Ct. 528 (1939); South Carolina State Highway
Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510 (1938); Kelly v. Washington, ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 87 (1937); Bradley v. Public Utilities
Commission, 289 U.S. 92, 53 S. Ct. 577 (1930); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374,
52 S. Ct. 581 (1931).
80 In McCarroll v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 60 S. Ct. 504 (1940),
Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas dissented, 309 U. S. at 188-189, saying,
"Judicial control of national commerce-unlike legislative regulations-must from
inherent limitations of the judicial process treat the subject by the hit-and-miss method of deciding single local controversies upon evidence and information limited by
the narrow rules of litigation. Spasmodic and unrelated instances of litigation cannot
afford an adequate basis for the creation of integrated national rules which alone can
afford that full protection of interstate commerce intended by the Constitution.
• • • Unconfined by 'the narrow scope of judicial proceedings' Congress alone can, in
the exercise of its plenary constitutional control over interstate commerce, not only
consider whether such a tax • • . is consistent with the best interests of our national
economy, but can also on the basis of full exploration of the many aspects of a complicated problem devise a national policy fair alike to the States and our Union."
Justice Black apparently would be willing to go even further, restricting invalidation
of state regulation to those cases where state legislation was, on its face, discriminatory
against interstate commerce. See his dissents in Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S.
307, 58 S. Ct. 913. (1938) and Gwin, White & Prince v. Henneford, 305 U. S. 434,
59 S. Ct. 325 (1935). In Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 at 400, 401, 62 S.
Ct. 3 II ( 1941), Justice Jackson, in a separate opinion concurring in the result, says,
"It is a tempting escape from a difficult question to pass to Congress the responsibility
for continued existence of local restraints and obstructions to national commerce. But
these restraints are individually to<? petty, too diversified, and too local to get the attention of a Congress hard pressed with more urgent matters•••• If the reaction of
this Court against what many of us have regarded as an excessive judicial interference
with legislative action is to yield wholesome results, w'e must be cautious lest we merely
rush to other extremes."
81 Principal case, 63 S. Ct. 307 at 319.
21

28

-
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demoralization of a state industry by a marketing program appropriate to
the ends sought and which does not discriminate against interstate commerce,
although it is likely to affect such commerce by increasing interstate prices and
decreasing to some extent interstate trade in raisins. With respect to conflicting
local and national interests, the Court pointed out that Congres.5 has recognized
the demoralization of the agricultural industry generally and has authorized
the Secretary of Agriculture to establish stabilization programs for various
products similar to the California raisin marketing program, which are likely
to result in raising prices and restricting interstate trade to some extent. Therefore, any effect the California program may have upon interstate commerce is
one which Congress itself has encouraged.
The principal case, with other recent cases, 82 is significant as indicating the
tendency of the Court to sustain state laws attacked as undue burdens on interstate commerce. Under the rationale of earlier decisions the holding of the
district court that the marketing program was an illegal interference with, and
an undue burden upon, interstate commerce would likely have been affirmed.
The attention which the Court devotes to the problem of federal-state conflicting legislation ss raises a question as to whether the "federal field" doctrine may
not in part supplant the commerce clause as a limitation on state legislation.
This question can be answered only by future decisions involving state regulatory measures.
,
Malcolm M. Davisson

82 Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U. S: 390, 62 S. Ct. 311 (1941); California v.
Thompson, 313 U. S. 109, 61 S. Ct. 930 (1941). Cf. Cloverleaf Butter Co. v.
Patterson, 315 U. S. 148, 62 S. Ct. 491 (1942).
88 See note 3, supra.

